David Halberstam's
War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals describes the formulation of
US policy regarding
Yugoslavia during the 90's. Halberstam is best known for
The Best and the Brightest, which examines the
policy makers in
Washington who got the
country into the
war in
Vietnam. His latest book pushes ahead three decades to explain how the
Bush and
Clinton administrations dealt with
Bosnia and
Kosovo.
Halberstam presents an overview of the events in the
Balkans, providing a
perspective that was lacking from the daily
news accounts. That overview is a background for understanding how the
US government leaders responded. However, Halberstam spends little time discussing the
aftermath following US actions. You'll need to read other books to discover those consequences, such as what happened in Bosnia after the
Dayton peace accords and the extent of damage caused by US
bombing during the Kosovo
campaign.
Instead, most of the book takes place in
DC. Halberstam provides a
biography of the major players, including their
backgrounds,
beliefs,
strengths,
weaknesses, and
relationships with one another. (Despite the book's title, these are mainly top-level
civilians in the
State Department,
Defense Department, and the
National Security Council.) He then portrays how they dealt with the ever-changing Yugoslav situation, in the context of various
political,
beauracratic, and interpersonal pressures.
The Bush and early Clinton administrations refused to take strong action regarding Bosnia, mainly because they didn't want to face the costs and risks of sending in
American troops. With underarmed
western European forces but no US forces on the ground, the US couldn't start bombing or lift the
arms embargo without undermining the
NATO allies. The Clinton administration was also thwarted by
Bill Clinton's lack of knowledge or familiarity with
foreign affairs, poor
organization (during the early years), and political
scandal and
partisanship (during the later years). (By the way, this was first time I viewed Clinton from a historical perspective.)
Eventually, motivated by escalating
atrocities, greater
domestic concern, and
Croatia's increased military strength as a
counterbalance to
Serbia, the US did respond. The US green-lighted the Croatian attack on Bosnian territory held by Serbia and orchestrated the diplomatic initiative leading to a peaceful settlement of the Bosnian conflict.
After that came the whole conflict in Kosovo. Eventually, the US bombing campaign, in conjunction with the threat of sending in NATO ground troops, made Serbia capitulate. The interesting part of these stories was the process by which the US
foreign policy establishment first hesitated, then took strong action with regard to Bosnia and Kosovo.
Halberstam also discusses what happened in
Somalia,
Haiti, and
Rwanda, in terms of the situation that the US encountered, how and why the US responded (or didn't respond), and what the result was. These were all situations where the US felt
pressure to act, mainly on
humanitarian grounds, in countries where it didn't have a direct interest. That's rather different than earlier military actions, which were based on
strategic,
geopolitical or
economic considerations. Of course, the recent war in
Afghanistan is unique in its own way.
Meanwhile, the perspective of the military was rather different than in past decades. New
technology made the bombings in the
Gulf War and Kosovo for more effective than the bombs dropped in Vietnam. At the same time, the military was very reluctant to get involved anywhere, demanded clear
objectives, an
exit strategy, and
contingency plans first. The
Vietnam War cast a long shadow on the policy makers and
generals, many of whom started their
careers in the midst of it.
It's a very interesting book. Halberstam strongly supports the US
interventions in Yugoslavia. He reveals the slow, laborious
process by which the US eventually did what was, in his mind, the right thing.